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With the ever-shrinking military budget constraints facing military and civilian 
contractors, the ability to extend the operational life of any system for minimal cost 
compared to a replacement is desirable. This fact has never been more true than in 
today's space industry. This thesis addresses the possibility of extending satellite life 
through the use of on-orbit refueling. Through compilation and analysis of satellite 
operational life span data, it is shown that maneuvering fuel depletion has a significant 
impact on satellite operations in geosynchronous orbit. If these satellites could be 
refueled economically this would prove not only cost-effective but also improve satellite 
tactical employment for space support to the warfighter. Through the manipulation of 
satellite data, launch/design cost, on-orbit refueling vehicle design/construction costs and 
on-orbit operational requirements, it can be shown that on-orbit refueling can be done 
cost effectively. Single versus multiple satellite refueling operations were evaluated to 
determine the concept's viability. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. WHY SATELLITE REFUELING? 
With ever-shrinking budget constraints facing the military and civilian 
contractors, the ability to get the most for your dollar has become a major factor in all 
programs. The ability to extend the operational life of any system, for minimal cost when 
compared to a complete system replacement, would obviously make that system much 
more desirable as well as salable. This fact has never been more true than in today's 
space industry. Budget constraints have become the driving force, resulting in the 
continual search for more efficiency and flexibility from new satellites and systems. 
If a satellite design life of five years could be extended to seven years, over a 
twenty year period a savings of more than one satellite and its associated launch cost 
could be realized. Currently, in the opinion of many, fuel usage drives the operational 
restrictions placed on satellites, with fuel being closely managed in order to utilize the 
complete satellite design life. A fully functional satellite, which has depleted its 
maneuvering/station keeping fuel to reserve levels, is no longer usable. The reserve fuel 
must be used to boost the satellite into a super-synchronous orbit in order to vacate the 
geo-synchronous slot for a replacement satellite. A second option is to use all fuel for on 
station maneuvering and allow the satellite to drift toward the nearest "dead point" which 
further complicates the space debris problem. If the satellite actual life exceeds design 
life, the operational limiting factor could very well be onboard maneuvering fuel. The 
ability to replenish satellite maneuvering fuel on-orbit could result in a significant 
satellite operational life extension. With little or no fuel budgeted for contingency 
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operations, the need to maneuver a communications or intelligence satellite to cover 
evolving regional conflicts (such as Iraq/Kuwait or Chinaffaiwan) could directly and 
disastrously affect the initial design fuel budget. Once a satellite/fuel load is placed on 
orbit, tactical repositioning would directly impact satellite life expectancy through the 
diversion of fuel budgeted for normal station keeping operations to satellite 
maneuvers/repositioning. Fuel considerations/limitations may also preclude development 
of operational concepts necessary to meet lower priority tasking/requirements. This 
"husbanding" of limited onboard fuel assets for strategic missions could negatively 
impact "space support to the war fighter". Again, the ability to replenish satellite 
maneuvering fuel on-orbit could result in significant operational flexibility, as well as 
increased operational life expectancy. 
There have been numerous proposals to develop a "satellite launch on command" 
capability to cover regional conflicts such as those previously mentioned. During 
operation Desert Storm there were grossly insufficient regional communications 
channels/capabilities, with "FLASH" message delivery often taking several days. The 
deployment of on-orbit units such as a "duty" communications or intelligence satellite 
which could be maneuvered to cover the latest global "hotspot" could compensate for this 
shortfall. However, the satellite must be able to maneuver freely without concern for 
onboard fuel. This concept would be feasible if a satellite was refuelable "on-orbit". 
The Westar 6 communications satellite, launched 4 February, 1984, suffered a 
PAM-D upper stage booster malfunction, stranding the satellite in a useless orbit. The 
apogee kick motor and onboard thrusters were used to boost the satellite to a higher orbit 
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for eventual retrieval by STS 51 A. Total rescue cost exceeded $10.5 million. On 4 
April, 1983, the launch ofTDRS 1 experienced a second stage IUS malfunction, which 
required the use of 30 onboard thruster burns, consuming 370kg of maneuvering fuel, to 
obtain desired orbital positioning. Most recently, a GPS Block III satellite experienced 
booster malfunction, which left the satellite in an orbit too low to fulfill mission 
requirements. The onboard fuel was sufficient to boost the satellite to the required 
operational orbit, however, the maneuver would consume the fuel budget for the entire 
satellite life span. The satellite was thus necessarily boosted into super-sychnronous 
orbit, fully functional but operationally worthless. Had these satellites been on-orbit 
refueling (OOR) capable, a refueling mission after initial satellite altitude repositioning 
could have restored the maneuvering fuel reserves and saved much of the cost of the 
replacement satellite/ associated launch or retrieval efforts. [Ref 7 ,Comsats] 
B. TACTICAL APPLICATIONS 
As airborne refueling revolutionized tactical and strategic aviation, an on-orbit 
satellite refueling capability could result in a similar expansion in mission scope and 
flexibility in space. The OOR capability would allow operational necessity vice fuel 
considerations to drive mission tasking. No longer must each satellite repositioning be 
weighed against the tactical or strategic "benefit" which often falls short when 
considering a limited maneuvering fuel budget. [Ref l,p.9-14] 
An OOR capability could allow for an actual decrease in initial onboard fuel 
budget, thus allowing for increased payload/mission capability. Current satellite design 
requires an onboard fuel capability sufficient to meet the design life expectancy. 
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However, care must be taken to not oversupply onboard fuel, to preclude the satellite 
reaching its end of life with several hundred pounds of now useless on-board fuel. With 
launch costs up to $10,000/pound to geosynchronous orbit (about 35,000km.), 
elimination of excess onboard weight is critical. Engineers must also consider the fact 
that many satellites exceed their scheduled design life, and hence may require additional 
on-board fuel if this proves to be the case. Engineers and designers must carefully 
balance all these factors and then hope for the best. I can think of nothing more 
frustrating than being forced to discard a fully functional satellite due to station-keeping 
fuel depletion. Although you may be gambling on a successful refueling mission, if the 
initial fuel budget is sufficient to meet design life, should actual satellite life exceed 
design life, OOR capability could solve the initial design dilemma. The tradeoffs would 
involve the actual weight of the docking/refueling apparatus versus the launch 
cost/weight penalty. However, if the weight increase would not dictate a shift to a larger 
payload capable launch vehicle, the impact would be minimal. 
The scope of this evaluation will be limited primarily to satellites in 
geosynchronous orbits (GEO). Due to the associated system redundancy required for 
the safety of manned expeditions and the associated expense, this evaluation will be 
limited to unmanned vehicles. Specific refueling vehicle design will not be addressed. 
The points which must first be addressed are: 
-Is on-orbit refueling (OOR) technologically feasible? 
- Is fuel actually a limiting factor in GEO satellite operations? 
-Is OOR cost effective? 
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II: SATELLITE ON-ORBIT SERVICING 
A. BACKGROUND 
On-orbit satellite servicing is not a new idea. The concept was recently explored 
in 1984, when NASA first discussed use of the space shuttle to retrieve, refuel and repair 
imaging reconnaissance satellites in order to extend their operational life spans. [Ref 2] 
This concept was first successfully demonstrated in April, 1984 during the recovery and 
repair of the Solar Maximum satellite. This shuttle mission was the first to use a direct 
insertion technique, which resulted in a shuttle apogee of 250nm, necessary to reach the 
265nm altitude of Solar Max.[Ref 3, p.42-44] The successful rendezvous with the 
satellite allowed astronauts, using extra-vehicular activity (EVA) suits and the shuttle 
manipulator arm, to successfully retrieve the 4,500lb satellite (after one initial failure) for 
repair in the shuttle bay. Replacing a failed General Electric attitude control box, the 
coronagraph's main electronic control box, and installing a vent port baffle to prevent 
plasma entry into satellite electronics took the two astronauts approximately six hours. 
The repair was made possible due to the Goddard/Fairchild multi-mission spacecraft 
modular design employed on Solar Max. [Ref 4, p.18] 
NASA's success with Solar Max led to the scheduled on-orbit attempt by shuttle 
mission 51-I to repair the $85-million Hughes/Navy Leasat 3 satellite. [Ref 5,p.48] At 
an altitude of 242nm, the 7.5ton Leasat 3 failed to activate after its initial deployment on 
April12, 1985 by STS-51D. A previous attempt by the mission 51-D crew to deploy the 
manual arming lever, using the shuttle manipulator arm, was unsuccessful. After some 
initial difficulty in retrieval, the satellite's sequencer was disabled and the booster motor 
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safety pinned. Two small panels were removed and a spin bypass unit was installed to 
allow Leasat 3 to process coirimands directly from the ground. After connecting a battery 
powered control box, the satellite's 7 .5ft omni antenna was deployed, which concluded 
the initial EVA at 7.62 hours. The second EVA of 2.45 hours consisted of the installation 
of temperature sensors on the motor nozzles, removal of previously installed safety pins 
and the activation of two 13 hour timers which precluded the processing of ground 
signals for 13 hours, in order to allow for safe withdrawal by the shuttle prior to satellite 
activation. [Ref 6, p.21-23] NASA received $8.5 million for conducting the successful 
repair effort. Compared to the initial satellite cost of $85 million (plus associated launch 
costs) coupled with a replacement satellite/launch costs, the repair was truly a bargain. 
[Ref 7, Comsats] 
The most recent and probably most famous instance of on-orbit servicing was 
conducted by STS-61, to repair the $1.5 billion Hubble Space Telescope (HST). After 
initial launch in 1990, scientist discovered the HST had several problems, the most 
significant being the inability to focus (due to improperly ground optics) as well as a 
"jitter" problem related to the solar arrays. The very rapid temperature change during 
day/night transitions resulted in array deflections, which although extremely minute, 
directly impacted HST operations. The original arrays were replaced with a shielded, 9 
coil spring mounting array, with an onboard braking control to eliminate solar induced 
array movement. Servicing also included: the installation of corrective optics space 
telescope axial replacement (Costar) to correct HST's vision flaws, swapping a second-
generation wide field camera, replacement of a failed relay box in the Goddard High 
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Resolution Spectrograph (GHRS), installation of a coprocessor module to add computer 
memory, replacement of three failed gyroscopic units, and change out of the 
magnetometer. [Ref 8, p.28-29] Although the HST was designed with multiple 
replaceable parts for periodic on orbit repair, many of the scheduled repair operations 
involved units or access panels which were not designed for on-orbit servicing. [Ref 9, 
p.14-16] Servicing efforts proved a resounding success, further justifying the on-orbit 
servicing satellite design concept. 
The concept of on-orbit refueling was successfully demonstrated on shuttle 
mission 41-G, by CDR David Leestma and Kathryn Sullivan. This proof of concept, 
using the Orbital Refueling System (ORS), demonstrated the capability to refuel satellites 
currently on-orbit which have not been specifically modified for refueling operations. 
This process involved special penetration of the fueling system. [Ref9, p.15] 
Although the use of shuttle manned EVA evolutions to conduct on-orbit servicing 
has proven successful in LEO, shuttle operational limitations preclude such operations 
above 400nm. [Ref 10, p. 179] Satellites which operate in :MEO or GEO with typical 
altitudes of as high as 22,000nm are not accessible to shuttle flights at this time. 
However, as successful as NASA has been in conducting on-orbit satellite repairs, the 
presence of manned evolutions significantly increases the cost. However, modular 
replacement or refueling operations using unmanned vehicles requires the satellite to be 
designed with this eventuality in mind. Several on-orbit service vehicle (OSV) design 
options have been evaluated, with the most significant being the Orbital Maneuvering 
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Vehicle (OMV), designed for NASA by the TRW Space and Support Group. Its primary 
missions include: 
- Spacecraft retrieval, reboost, deboost or viewing 
- Spacecraft on-orbit servicing, including refueling and component 
replacement 
- Space station construction and logistics support 
- Large observatory service (HST) from either space station or shuttle 
-Experiment carrier for sub-satellite missions [Ref 1, p.32-33] 
NASA plans call for the OMV to be deployed via the space shuttle and later 
retrieved for return to earth for periodic servicing. The OMV is 15 feet in diameter and is 
56 inches in length (see Figures 1, 2 and 3). It incorporates a fully modular 
configuration which allows on-orbit replenishment of fuels as well as replacement of 
modular units (ORUs). The OMV was designed to service satellites in LEO, polar orbits 
(inclinations above 57 degrees) which are not accessible by shuttle operations. [Ref 
11,p.29-33] 
Although intended for use in LEO operations, the OMV unmanned servicing 
vehicle concept can be applied to satellite refueling operations in GEO. However, 
automation maneuvers must be precise and assured. The two major limiting factors of 
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Figure 3. OMV shown docked with satellite. 
A semi-autonomous navigation and docking capability has been developed. 
Using optical reference patterns and a computer vision system to determine relative 
position and attitude, semi-autonomous docking has been evaluated using both 
11 
L___ --------------~--
"passive" and "active" targets. Active targets have visual reference "cuing markers" 
installed prior to launch, while passive targets do not. Only the primary spacecraft is 
under active control, with the docking target completely independent. Cuing markers 
consist of geometric patterns which provide orientation and/or distance reference using 
the geometric patterns (see Figure 4). Nesting a series of these optical patterns provides 
a means by which an autonomous cross-correlator guided craft can determine its range 
and orientation during approach and docking maneuvers (see Figure 5). At the furthest 
distance the largest pattern is · used as a reference. Upon closer approach, the correlation 
pattern grows larger and larger in the field of view until it actually reaches a range where 
the complete target is no longer visible. At this point a smaller nested array, located at 
the center of the first pattern is discernable, and the system begins to process the second 
pattern for range and orientation data. The simple task of recognizing a single visual 
pattern, in a cluttered environment is well within the capability of an optical cross 
correlator. This single-function vision device can accurately provide the necessary 
recognition and spatial orientation necessary for semi-autonomous navigation, landing 
and docking in three dimensional space, without natural landmarks. The single-
functional optical cross- correlator, using video input from a simple imaging camera and 
optical correlation-plane output coupled with standard star tracker software, provides 
sufficient information for spacecraft navigation and docking maneuvers in space. [Ref 11, 
p.5049-55] 
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The insert shows the four-peak pattern in 
the simulated correlation plane. Example ¢ 
shown of attitude determination. 
.. ' . . 
. . . . . 
. . . 
The four-star target pattern may 
be used for range determination. ¢ 
The star-target distribution shown 
is closer than the example shown 
at the top of the page. 
:_,:·· : ... :.~.;: 
. . . . 
·. ·... ... . .... -. ·. 
The out-of-plane rotation of the 
¢:1 array of sector-star targets results 
in the foreshortened triangles in 
the simulated correlation. 
Figure 4. Four-sector star target visual patterns used for attitude determination. 
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Figure 5. Simulated docking port with three sector-star targets attached. 
The following conditions are required: 
- The spacecraft must be a rigid body with three pairs of gas jet thrusters 
mounted along the principle axes for control of spacecraft translational and 
rotational motion. 
- A pinhole camera is rigidly mounted on the spacecraft. The cuing marks 
located on the docking target platform are always visible to the spacecraft. 
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Computer-vision based methods have several advantages over the use of sensors 
such as laser, infrared, radar, GPS or INS. Specifically, the estimation accuracy of the 
relative position and vehicle orientation improves as the range between the two vehicles 
decreases. Thus, the control accuracy of the system control loops improves 
proportionally (see Figure 6 and 7). Hence, the computer-vision based control and 
docking system is well suited for precise maneuvers required for autonomous satellite 
docking. [Ref 12, p.649] 
Currently, Russia conducts resupply missions to the MIR space station using the 
Progress spacecraft, which employs the Kurs automatic rendezvous and docking system. 
A back-up remote control docking capability has been developed, which although not 
autonomous, does not require manned participation on-orbit. The TV -aided system 
enables ground-based controllers to remotely fly the spacecraft for rendezvous and 
docking. A television camera provides live images to the ground-based cosmonaut, 
who will dock the spacecraft using two control sticks, much as if he were actually 
on board. A successful demonstration of this system was conducted in 1993 by a 
cosmonaut onboard the MIR space station. [Ref 13,p.70] Hence, docking unmanned 
refueling missions should not pose a technical problem. 
There are three major methods of on-orbit propellant transfer: direct fluid transfer, 
tank to vehicle transfer, and propulsion module to vehicle transfer. Direct fluid transfer, 
as implied by the name, involves the transfer of fuel from the servicing vehicle directly to 
the satellite tank. Tank to vehicle transfer involves the transfer of full fuel tanks to the 
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installation of a complete propulsion system to include the propellant tanks, main 
engines, thrusters, fluid lines and management systems and controls. Trade studies and 
evaluations revealed that the direct fuel transfer was the most cost effective and feasible 
technique, and has the least impact on spacecraft design. Additionally, this method 
allows full utilization of onboard fuel, while requiring the smallest number of interfaces. 
Disadvantages involve safety concerns related to actual displacement of propellant from 
one tank to another. The primary focus of this study involved fueling in space for long 
duration missions, such as manned Mars exploration. Hence, concerns of lengthy fuel 
transfer durations and the associated large pumping capability required would not apply 
to satellite refueling, due to the much smaller relative fuel quantities required for satellite 
stationkeeping/maneuvering operations. [Ref 14, p.1423-33] 
The transfer of fuel is complicated by many factors, the most significant involving 
a means of pumping fuel in a near weightless environment and the necessity to vent waste 
gases from the receiving tank as it fills, without venting fluids. Fuel cannot be gravity fed 
for obvious reason. The most promising on-orbit servicing method for direct fuel transfer 
under these conditions involves the use of a screen-channel liquid acquisition device 
(LAD). Designs for screen LADs are usually conduits, with walls made of porous, fine 
mesh screen, which are routed around the tank perimeter and manifold at the tank outlet. 
[Ref 15, p.1099-1106] 
The capability for fuel/fluid transfer on-orbit was successfully demonstrated on 
shuttle mission 41-G during astronaut EVAs. However, EVAs are an expensive option 
and do not meet stated goals of autonomous operations. NASA conducted Fluid 
18 
Acquisition and Resupply Experiments (FARE) in shuttle middeck experiments to 
demonstrate LAD techniques for transferring liquids in zero gravity (see Figure 8, 9 and 
10). The first experiment occurred on STS 53, launched December 2, 1992, with the 
second on STS 57 in June of 1993. The objective was to demonstrate tank refilling, low 
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Figure 9. FARE 1 receiver tank configuration. 
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efficiency of at least 98% was obtained and final fill levels of greater than 95% were 
routinely achieved without the venting of liquid overboard, thus validating capabilities to 
refuel spacecraft on-orbit. [Ref 16, p.1-12] 
Although the problems presented by autonomous docking and on-orbit fluid 
transfer are technoligically challenging, they remain well within the range of current 
mechanical and scientific capabilities. However, production and integration costs may 
dictate actual system applications in order to assure maximum cost effectiveness. The 
most obvious question at this juncture remains, does satellite maneuvering fuel actually 
impact satellite life span and operations to the point that on-orbit refueling is necessary? 
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III. SATELLITE DATA ANALYSIS 
A. SATELLITE LIFE-SPAN ANALYSIS 
Prior to conducting a cost effectiveness analysis of on-orbit satellite refueling, the 
data concerning a satellite's actual life and its design life must be examined. Without 
addressing the tactical maneuvering of satellites and associated fuel considerations, 
satellite life expectancy is an important factor in determining if the need to refuel exists. 
The satellite data listed in Appendix A- Part 1 (page 1 and 2), was compiled from Jane's 
Spacecraft 1984-1996, lnteravia Space Directory 1986-1996, as well as inputs from 
various contractors such as TRW, Hughes, etc. The data set consists of U.S. satellites, 
launched to geosynchronous orbit, in the last 20 years. Analysis of satellites which have 
reached geosynchronous orbit and full operational status (i.e., they have not experienced 
launch-related failures) follows: 
Sample Size Mean Design Life StdDev Mean Actual Life StdDev 
57 Satellites 8.11 years 1.94 years 11.41 years 3.08 years 
Table 3-1 
With the satellite actual life exceeding design life by an average of 3.3 years, this 
data supports the hypothesis that satellites typically exceed design life expectations. 
However, these statistics are somewhat misleading, as 28 of the 57 subject satellites are 
still operational (SOPER). This computation assumes each satellite, even if still 
operational, has reached end-of-life (EOL). (GOES 5/6 experienced imagery 
failure (the primary mission), but continued service in a data relay mode until fuel 
depletion. The primary mission role was used in assessing mean satellite life.) 
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Evaluating only the satellites which have actually reached EOL shows: 
Sample Size Mean Design Life StdDev Mean Actual Life StdDev 
29 Satellites 7.66 years 2.09 years 10.43 years 3.56 years 
Table 3-2 
With the satellite actual life exceeding design life by an average of 2. 77 years or 26.55 
percent, this data is .6 years less than the total sample average life delta of 3.3 years, but 
within the standard deviation. 
Evaluating only the SOPER satellites yields: 
Sample Size Mean Design Life StdDev Mean Actual Life StdDev 
28 Satellites 8.46 years 1.69 years 12.43 years 2.10years 
Table 3-3 
Examination of the SOPER satellite subset reveals that satellite actual life 
currently exceeds design life by 3.97 years or 31.93 percent. The SOPER satellite subset 
life delta is greater than both the entire satellite sample delta (3.08 years) and the EOL 
satellite delta (2.77 years). As these satellites are still operational, each passing year will 
increase the life delta until all satellites have reached EOL. Even without considering 
these additional active years, there is significant evidence that satellite actual life 
consistently exceeds satellite design life, regardless of sample data chosen. However, 
for the purpose of this cost effectiveness study, the average satellite life delta of three 
years will be used. 
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B. SATELLITE FUEL ANALYSIS 
The next question which must be addressed is, did fuel play a significant role in 
satellite failures? Fuel depletion is an obvious fuel impact, but other factors must be 
considered. Satellites which are still operational, but are nearing maneuvering fuel 
limits/depletion, often continue East/West stationkeeping but cease North/South station 
keeping in order to conserve maneuvering fuel. This practice results in geosynchronous 
satellites assuming inclined orbits, which impacts the satellite's area of coverage or 
"footprint" on the earth. This will impact coverage in peripheral areas at the northern and 
southern extremes of coverage. As the inclination increases (about 1 degree/year without 
correction) the affected area increases as well. Satellites conducting fuel conservation 
operations (FCO) are thus impacted by fuel limitations. 
Examining the cause of failure for the 29 satellites which have reached EOL 
reveals that nine satellites (31 percent) ceased operation due to maneuvering fuel 
depletion. This number increases to 11 satellites (37. 93 percent) if the fuel depletion of 
GOES 5/6 is considered. Examining the SOPER satellites reveals that 19 of 28 (67.85 
percent) satellites are currently conducting fuel conservation operations. Comparing the 
EOL and SOPER data: 
X Design Life X Actual Life Life Delta~ ~% Fuel hnpact 
EOL 7.66 years 10.43 years 2.77 years 26.55% 37.93% 





Even without the inevitable increase in the SOPER satellite life delta, with current 
satellite design life ranging from 10 to 15 years (see Appendix A, p. 3-5), fuel 
considerations in the future will continue to significantly impact satellite operations. 
A projection for the satellites launched since 1990 shows: 
X Design Life X Actual Life Life Delta 1::. 1::.% Assumption 
Since 1990 11.37 years 14.89 years 3.52 years 31.21% No Increase 
Since 1990 11.37 years 15.45 years 4.09 years 35.87% Projected 
Table 3-5 
Both "no increase" and "projected increase" in satellite design life versus actual life 
options are shown, with the projected increase based on the EOUSOPER satellite 
design/observed life data. Although this projection is rather crude, even using the current 
satellite life delta of 31.21 percent, this data indicates that fuel considerations are 
becoming increasingly more significant. 
Combining the entire satellite sample and associated fuel considerations, 30 of 57 
(52.63%) satellites experienced some fuel-related operational impacts, with 20 percent 
failing due to fuel depletion. A convincing argument can be made that fuel limitations 
have a significant impact on satellite operations and that an on-orbit refueling capability 
could play a major role in solving this problem. 
There are many alternative solutions to the satellite fuel problem other than on-
orbit refueling. Many satellites, such as INTELSAT 706, are carrying additional fuel to 
preclude a fuel depletion problem. However, there are satellites, such as GALAXY 517, 
which do not carry sufficient fuel to meet expected design life. UFO satellites, which 
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previously experienced a fuel surplus, have recently seen this benefit eliminated due to a 
payload-for-fuel substitution. Additional fuel for UFO is not an option as the satellite is 
currently within 50 pounds of maxing out the launch vehicle payload capability. [Ref 17] 
As satellite design life continues to increase, there must be a point where it becomes 
economically and physically impossible to provide sufficient onboard fuel to meet design 
life. However, if tactical maneuvering of satellites is considered a viable mission 
requirement, on-orbit refueling is the only logical solution. The next question is, can it be 
done cost effectively? 
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IV: OOR DESIGN 
A. OOR SPECIFICATIONS 
As this is primarily a cost effectiveness analysis of the OOR concept, the specific 
design of the OOR will not be addressed. However, some general concepts and design 
configurations must be identified. Simplicity of design should be incorporated whenever 
feasible, utilizing as much existing proven space technology as possible. The OOR must 
have a configuration which would support launch on Titan N (IUS) or comparable 
launch vehicle. Using the large payload fairing limits of the Titan N, the OOR can be a 
maximum width of 5.1 meters and height of 15-26 meters in the stowed configuration. 
Maximum payload launch weight is 5250lbs. OOR design will be limited to 3562lbs 
(2762lbs dry weight/800lbs of fuel), which will allow approximately 1700lbs of design 
weight error margin when considering the 5200lb Titan N (IUS) launch capacity. 
The Fuel Transfer System (FTS) design should assume the use of mono-propellant 
(the primary fuel used in geo-synchronous satellites). With 800lbs of total fuel onboard, 
the OOR should also use mono-propellant to preclude the necessity of two separate fuel 
systems. With an anticipated total fuel load of 800lbs of mono-propellant, the transfer 
system is envisioned with the ability to feed both its own thrusters and the refueling 
system from any fuel tank/cell. This cross-feed design feature would preclude the OOR 
from depleting maneuvering fuel with transferable fuel still onboard and vice-versa. This 
would allow maximum flexibility and utilization of all onboard fuel. However, to 
preclude a compromise in fuel system integrity from depleting the entire onboard fuel 
supply, each tank should be selectively isolated from the others. Primary transfer is 
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envisioned through the docking mechanism; however, a secondary transfer system 
should be available. This secondary system might consist of remote tele-robotics using 
an umbilical fuel probe in the event that satellite docking is not feasible or the primary 
system fails. 
Docking and refueling operations may preclude optimal orientation of solar 
arrays. Onboard battery power should be sufficient to complete a refueling operation 
without solar array support. Upon completion of the refueling mission, the OOR can then 
be reoriented to recharge batteries. 
With a payload of 800lbs of fuel, in addition to the required fuel transfer system 
of 300lbs, the structure of the OOR must be robust. Additionally, sufficient structural 
integrity is required to support docking maneuvers and its associated structural stresses. 
The command and control communications required by a remote/autonomous 
docking system are considered in addition to normal TT &C operations. Sufficient 
redundancy is required to ensure communications can be maintained throughout mission 
life. 
The OOR concept is obviously not applicable to satellites currently on-orbit, and 
hence it must be designed with the "future customer" in mind. If the concept is to prove 
viable, satellites must be designed to accept fuel servicing from the OOR from initial 
inception. This dictates the early, standardized design of a docking and fuel transfer 
mechanism and specifications which will meet the needs of most if not all satellite 
designs. Clearance and configuration requirements for OOR docking must be identified 
early. From the docking port into the spacecraft would be the design responsibility of 
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each individual satellite manufacturer, thus minimizing the concept's impact on 
individual satellite design. It is anticipated that through early design and integration, the 
docking/refueling mechanism should impose minimum impact on satellite weight 
budget/cost. However, later integration could prove extremely costly, depending on the 
design progress of the satellite. With these factors in mind a cost analysis to construct 
the OOR follows. 
B. OOR DESIGN/COST PARAMETERS 
In 1997 NASA is scheduled to fly ETS-7 to verify remote on-orbit docking and 
robotic repair/servicing technology. ETS-7 consists of a chaser and target satellite 
(Figure 11), which weigh 2.2t and 0.4t respectively. [Ref 18, p.1627] Using the 
approximate size/configuration ofETS-7 and DSCS-lliB satellite costing data, a cost 
estimate for an on-orbit refueling vehicle was computed. Adjustments in size/ 
configuration for the OOR were made using the Unmanned Space System Cost Model, 
Seventh Edition [Ref 20] and verified using the Space Mission Analysis and Design, 
Second Edition [Ref 21] for an overall system "reality check" of the design process. 
Since specific system data and configuration is not available for ETS-7, DSCS-lliB was 
chosen as a cost/equipment reference satellite due to its similar configuration to ETS-7, 
its geosynchronous orbit, recent technologynaunch date (1994) and availability of 
configuration data (Appendix B) from the Unmanned Space Vehicle Cost Model. 
Adjustments to the OOR design from DSCS lliB and ETS-7 are shown in Table 4-1, 
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along with the recommended percentage of system design parameters from SMAD. 
SMAD percentages are based on a historical satellite program data base. 
DSCS-IllB Percentage OOR Percentage SMAD% 
Structure 330 lbs 17.52% 750lbs 27.50% 21.06% 
Thermal 102lbs 5.42% 165lbs 6.05% 4.45% 
Communication 632lbs 33.56% 307lbs 12.9% See 
(DSCS Payload) Payload 
Below 
TT&C 72lbs 3.82% 75lbs 2.75% 4.41% 
ADCS 64lbs 3.39% 380 lbs 11.00% 5.99% 
Power 585lbs 31.06% 585lbs 21.45% 29.90% 
Propulsion 98lbs 5.20% 200lbs 07.30% 4.31% 
Refueling Kit N/A N/A 300 lbs 11.00% 28% 
(OOR Payload) (complies 
w/fuel 
added) 
Dry Weight 1883lbs 2762 
lbs 
Table4-1 
NOTE: -Communications weight was adjusted downward from DSCS-IllB, as 
communications is the DSCS primary mission. 
- Propulsion weight was adjusted upward from DSCS- IllB, as docking 
maneuvers will require a more precise system/propulsion between satellite refuels. 
- Structure weight was adjusted upward, necessary to support the added weight of 
fuel to the refueling system. 
33 
- ADCS was adjusted upward to include three axis stabilization, using momentum 
wheels. 
C. CALCULATIONS FOR RECURRING COSTS 
[All Equations from Unmanned Space Vehicle Cost Model, Seventh Edition 
(1994) Ref 20] 
The Unmanned Space Vehicle Cost Model (USCM) is published by the U.S. Air 
Force Material Command, Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles, California. 
This manual, which was used to estimate the OOR cost, is a parametric estimating tool 
based on cost estimating relationships (CER) built from a factual historical database. 
Satellite systems have been broken down into costing factors/equations which can be 
used for cost estimates for future satellite systems. The USCM breaks satellite program 
costs into six basic satellite subsystems: Power, Structure, Attitude Determination and 
Control (ADCS), Tracking, Telemetry and Control (TT &C), Propulsion, and Thermal 
Control. For each of these subsystems, the USCM shows the primary costing factors 
associated with it based on a satellite design/cost historical data base. Additionally, the 
payload must be addressed for cost analysis. On DSCS-IIIB, the communications system 
was the payload; however, on the OOR the refueling package would be considered the 
payload. The cost analysis for the OOR is computed below. Specific cost multiples or 
cost estimating relationships (CERs) have been derived from previous satellite programs. 
These CERs can be applied to a specific example to estimate system cost, typically using 
system or component weight. All cost values computed are in thousands of dollars and 
recurring cost estimates are summarized in Table 4-2. 
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1. STRUCTURE 
Spacecraft Structure 750 lbs 
Y =(5.838)(Xl) 
Where Xl= Structure Weight 
Y = CER value for Spacecraft Structure 
Therefore Y = 4378.5 
2.THERMAL 
Thermal Weight 
-Active Thermal Weight 
- Passive Thennal Weight 
- Total Thennal Weight 
Y=76.171 + (12.187)(Xl) + (4.511)(X2) 
Where Xl= Active Weight 




Y = CER value for Spacecraft Structure 
Therefore Y = 1365.48 
3. ADCS 
ADCS 
-Attitude Detennination Suite Weight 
- RCS Suite Weight 
- Total ADCS Weight 




Where Xl =Attitude Determination Suite Weight 
Y = CER value for ADCS (Attitude Determination) 
Therefore Y = 11,389.53 
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y =(27 .667)(XI o.619)(X2o.473) 
Where XI= Reaction Control System Suite Weight 
X2 = Design Life (I 0/2 Y rs) 
Y = CER value for ADCS(Reaction Control) 
Therefore Y = 2184.24 - 10 yrs/1020 - 2 years 
4. ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM 
EPS 
- Number of Solar Cells 
- Generation Suite Weight 
Y =(7 .894 )(X I 0·588) 
Where XI= Number of Solar Cells 
3000 
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Y = CER value for Power Generation 
Therefore y = 874.67 
EPS 
- Beginning of Life Power 
- Storage Suite Weil!ht 
Y=(2.722)(XI 0·848) 
Where XI= Beginning of Life Power 
Y = CER value for Power Storage 
Therefore y = 1111.82 
EPS Suite Weight 
Y=(58.775)(XI0·713) 




Y = CER value for Power Conditioning and Distribution 
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Therefore y =5523.0 
5. TELE:METRY, TRACKING AND CONTROL 
IT &C Transmitter (2) 
-UHF 
-SHF 
Y=(76.928) + (20.435)(Xl) 
Where Xl= Transmitter Weight 
Y = CER value for TT &C Transmitter 
Therefore y = 158.67 (UHF) 
Y = 199.54 (SHF) 
IT &C Receiver/Exciter 
Y =( 4 7 .359)(X lu05)(X2°.420) 
Where Xl= Receive/Exciter Suite Weight 
X2= Number of Receiver Boxes 
Y = CER value for TT &C Receiver/Exciter 
Therefore y =718.25 
IT &C Transponder (2) 
Y=(377.529)(Xl 0·281) 
Where Xl= Transponder Weight 
Y = CER value for Power Storage 
Therefore Y = 850.52 
IT &C Digital Electronics 
- Suite Weight 
- Number of Digital Elect Boxes 










Where XI= Digital Electronics Suite Weight 
X2= Number of Digital Electronic Boxes 
X3= Number of Links 
Y = CER value for TT &C Digital Electronics 
Therefore Y=2593.49 
IT &C Analog Electronics 
- Suite Weight. 
- Solenoid Driver ( 4) 
- Squib Driver ( 4) 
Y=(II3.777)(XI0·519) 




Y = CER value for TT &C Analog Electronic 
Solenoid Driver (qty) YI= Y(qty0·926) 
Squib Driver (qty) Y = (13.777)(X2°519)(Qty926) 
Where X2= Squib Driver Weight 
Solenoid= 451.5 Squib= 660.83 
IT &C Antenna( Hom & Radiator) 
- Hom & Radiator 
-Gain 
- Wavelength 
- Effective Area 
Y=(II9.35I)(XI0·708)(X2°·240) 
Where XI= Antenna Weight 





Y = CER value for TT &C Antenna (Hom & Radiator) 
Therefore y =269.67 
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TI'&C Antenna (Dipoles) 1lb 
Y=(26.609)(XlL070) 
Where Xl= Antenna Weight 
Y = CER value for TT &C Antenna (Dipoles) 
Therefore y =26.61 
TI'&C Antenna (S-Band) 
- S-Band Weight 
-Gain 
- Wavelength 
- E ective Area 
Y=(64.560)(XlL009)(X2°·315) 
Where Xl= Antenna Weight 





Y = CER value for TT&C Antenna (S-Band) 
Therefore Y=33.51 
TI'&C RF Distribution 2.4lb 
Y=(-7.386) + (29.180)(Xl) + (70.676)(X2) 
Where Xl= RF Distribution Weight 
X2= Active (1 =Yes, 0 =No) 
Y = CER value for TT &C RF Distribution 
Therefore y = 133.32 
6. COMMUNICATIONS 
Communications Transmitter (TWTA) 
- TWTA Weight 







Y =(22.196)(X 1 °·727)(X2°·28~ 
Where X1=TWTA Weight 
X2= WPF- Weighted Composite Variable 
Y = CER value for Communications Transmitter (TWT A) 
Therefore y = 375.0 
Communications Transmitter (Solid State) 
- Solid State Transmitter Weight 
- Output Power 
- Component Quantity 
Y=(338.550) + (25.557)(X1) + (9.985)(X2) 
Where X1= Solid State Transmitter Weight 




Y = CER value for Communications Transmitter (Solid 
State) 
Therefore y =2048.0 
Communications Receiver/Exciter Weight (2) 30lbs 
Y =( 193 .30)(X 1 °·675) 
Where X1= Receiver/Exciter Suite Weight 
Y = CER value for Communications Receiver/Exciter 
Therefore y = 1920.0 
Communications Transponder Weight (2) 30lbs 
Y=(67.433)(X1) 
Where X1= Transponder Weight 
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· Y = CER value for Communications Transponder 
Therefore Y = 2023.0 
Communications Digital Electronics Weight 56.96lbs 
Y =( 515 .079)(X 1 °·379) 
Where X1= Digital Electronics Suite Weight 
Y = CER value for Communications Digital Electronics 
Therefore y =2383.61 
Communications 
- Weight of Other Antenna Components 
- Weight of Hom, Dish 
-Antenna Suite Weight 




Where X1= Weight of Other Antenna Components 
X2= Weight of Hom, UHF Dish 
Y = CER value for Communications Antenna 
Therefore y = 727.26 
Communications Antenna (Reflectors) 
-Antenna Reflector Diameter Squared 
Y =(7 5 .849)(X 1 °·935) 
8 sgfl_ 
Where X1= Antenna Reflector Diameter Squared 
Y = CER value for Communications Antenna Reflectors 
Therefore Y=530.07 
Communications RF Distribution 
- RF Distribution Suite Active Weight 6lbs 
- RF Distribution Suite Wave Guide Weil[ht 6 lbs 
Y=(82.601)(X1) + (11.856)(X2) 
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Where XI= Distribution Suite Active Weight 
X2= RF Distribution Suite Wave Guide Weight 
Y = CER value for Communications RF Distribution 
Therefore Y = 566.74 
7. FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM (DRY WT) 
FTS Total Weight 300 lbs 
Y=3(Xt22 } 
Where X= FTS Total Weight 
Y = CER value for FTS 
Therefore Y = 3156.52 
8. INTEGRATION ASSEMBLY AND TEST (IA&T) 
IA&T 
- Spacecraft Weight 






Where XI= Spacecraft Weight+ Payload Total Weight 
Y = CER value for IA&T 
Therefore y = 13,348.75 
9. PROGRAM LEVEL 
Spacecraft Vehicle Total Recurring Cost 67197.69 
Y=(.289)(XI) 
Where XI= Spacecraft Total Recurring Cost 
Y = CER value for Program Level 
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Therefore y = 19420.13 
10. LOOS- (3 AXIS STABILIZED SATELLITES) 
Spacecraft Weight 2762lbs 
Y=(2.212)(X1) 
Where X1= Spacecraft Weight+ Payload Total Weight 
Y = CER value for Operations and Orbital Support 
Therefore Y=6695.72 
SMAD cost modeling calls for a cost adjustment (multiplier) greater than 1.1, for 
satellite designs employing new technology or advanced development concepts. This 
cost multiple deals with the uncertainty of new technology and the associated integration 
issues. For the purpose of this cost analysis a cost adjustment multiple of 1.3 will be 
used due to the incorporation of remote docking using visual references and the fuel 
transfer system in the OOR. This yields a final cost estimate of: 
($86617) x (1.3) = $112.602 rounded to 113 Million 
This figure shall be used as OOR recurring costs for the cost effectiveness 
calculations in Chapter V. Specific non-recurring cost data for future satellite programs 
is not known. Although difficult to accurately estimate, an attempt to predict OOR non-
recurring costs is summarized in Appendix C. However, it will be assumed that many of 
these cost would be offset by similar costs in repalcement satellite programs. 
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RECURRING COST SUMMARY 
(in Thousands of Dollars) 
Structure 
Thermal 
Attitude Determination & Control 
ADCS - Attitude Determination (RCS) 
Electrical Power System - Generation 
EPS - Storage 
EPS - PCD 
Telemetry, Tracking & Conunand 
TT&C - Transmitter (UHF) 
TT&C - Transmitter (SHF) 
TT&C - Receiver/Exciter 
TT&C - Transponder 
TT&C - Digital Electronics 
TT&C - Analog Electronics (Solenoid) 
TT&C - Analog Electronics (Squib) 
TT&C - Antenna Horn & Radiator 
TT&C - Antenna Dipoles 
TT&C - S-Band Antennas 
TT&C - RF Distribution 
Conununications 
Conun - Transmitter (TWTA) 
Conun - Solid State 
Conun - Receiver/Exciter 
Conun - Transponder 
Conun - Digital Electronics 
Conun - Antenna 
Conun - Antenna Reflectors 
Conun - RF Distribution 
I LOOS - 3 Axis Stabilized I 
I Fuel Transfer SJ::Stem I 
Total Spacecraft 
T 
Program Level Cost 



































V: OOR COST FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT 
A. COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
When evaluating the cost effectiveness of on-orbit refueling, it is tempting to use 
the cost/year approach which compares the replacement cost of a satellite and its design 
life to the OOR cost and its capability to refuel some specific number of satellites. This 
approach would yield: 
Cost Life or Life Delta CostlY ear of Satellite Life 
Replacement Satellite $98.85M 11.27 yrs $8.77M 
OOR Vehicle $113M i Satellite(s) serviced 
(varies 1-N) with a 
life delta of 3yrs 






This comparison results in an apparent break-even point for refueling/replacement at 5 
satellites serviced versus one replacement. However, this comparison does not take into 
account launch cost of either the replacement satellite or the OOR (the OOR is the same 
approximate weight class as the average satellite launched since 1990). When launch 
costs are considered the results appear slightly different. Specifically, with each satellite 
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refueled on-orbit the associated launch cost of the necessary replacement and (hence, not-




Lc = OOR Launch Cost 
PL.a =%increase in satellite Life 
Sc = Replacement Satellite Cost 
Lc = Satellite Launch Cost 
i = Number of Satellites Refueled/ 
Mission 
The cost effective or break-even point of OOR can be determined when the value of the 
left side of this equation exceeds the value of the right 
The statistical data to be used for this analysis is as follows: 
EQUATION RELATED DATA TERM VALUE 
x Satellite life delta (design life versus actual life) % = 3.0/ 3.0 years-
26% 
x Satellite design 11.27 11.27years 
x Satellite cost Sr $98.8SM 
Launch cost for OOR/Satellite Lc $214/227M 
On-Orbit Refueling Vehicle Cost Rc $113M 
Table 5-2. 
The satellite life delta of 3 years was demonstrated in Chapter ill (Table 3-4), 
using the satellite data from Appendix A. The mean design life of satellites 
launched/contracted since 1990 and mean satellite cost (for satellites launched/contracted 
since 1990) were also derived from satellite data (See Appendix A). Satellite launch cost 
was determined from the International Reference Guide To Space Launch Systems (1991 
Edition) [Ref 19] and is shown in Table 5-3. The Titan launch platform with IUS was 
chosen for its ability to place the OOR/satellites in geosynchronous orbit. 
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LAUNCH MAX PAYLOAD TO GEOSYNCHRONOUS COST 
VEHICLE ORBIT 
Titan N (IUS) 5250 lbs (2380 kg) $214M 
TitanN 10000 lbs ( 4540 kg) $227M 
(Centaur) 
Table 5-3 
Utilizing the values from Table 5-2 ($214M launch cost), the cost analysis looks like 
this: 
(Rc + Lc) = IJ (Sc + Lc )i X (P L~)] (Where i varies from 1 to N) 
($113M+ $214M)= LJ($98.85M + $214M)(i=ll26%)] + 
[($98.85M + $214M)(i= 2>(26%)] + 
[($98.85M + $214M)<i= 3>(26%)] + 
[($98.85M + $214M)<i= 4l26%)] etc. 
The break-even or cost effective point actually falls at i = 4.02 satellites serviced. 
Using the higher launch cost of $227 for a larger satellite yields a cost effective point at i 
= 3.85 satellites serviced. 
B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
A sensitivity analysis on one factor at a time yields the following results: 
10% INCREASE NEW VALUE SATELLITES TO BE SERVICED 
IN: 
Satellite Design Life 12.4 years- 4.32 satellites 
24.2% 
Satellite Life Delta 3.3 years- 3.57 satellites 
29.28% 
Satellite Cost $108.73M 3.90 satellites 
OORCost $138.6M 4.16 satellites 
Launch Cost $235.4M 4.01 satellites 
Table 5-4 
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20% INCREASE NEW VALUE SATELLITES TO BE SERVICED 
IN: 
Satellite Design Life 13.52 years - 4. 71 satellites 
22.18% 
Satellite Life Delta 3.6 years- 3.27 satellites 
31.94% 
Satellite Cost $118.62M 3.78 satellites 
OORCost 151.2M 4.30 satellites 
Launch Cost $256.8M 4.00 satellites 
Table 5-5 
30% INCREASE NEW VALUE SATELLITES TO BE SERVICED 
IN: 
Satellite Design Life 14.65 years - 5.11 satellites 
20.47% 
Satellite Life Delta 3.90 years- 3.02 satellites 
34.61% 
Satellite Cost $128.51M 3.67 satellites 
OORCost $163.8M 4.44 satellites 
Launch Cost 278.82M 3.99 satellites 
Table 5-6 
50% INCREASE NEW VALUE SATELLITES TO BE SERVICED 
IN: 
Satellite Design Life 16.91 years- 5.89 satellites 
17.74% 
Satellite Life Delta 4.5 years- 2.62 satellites 
39.9% 
Satellite Cost $148.28M 3.47 satellites 
OORCost $189M 4.72 satellites 
Launch Cost $321M 3.98 satellites 
Table 5-7 
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Initial data analysis indicates that an increase in satellite design life would greatly 
impact the cost effective point of OOR, increasing the required number of satellites to be 
serviced to 5.89 with a 50% increase in design life. However, we are again faced with the 
dilemma of onboard fuel; specifically, can you carry enough to meet the increased design 
life? This also does not address the associated cost increase necessary to increase 
satellite reliability throughout design life. Increases in the satellite life delta yield 
promise, in that an increase from three to four years reduces the number of satellites 
serviced for cost effectiveness to 3.02 (Table 5-6). This is significant when you consider 
that the satellite life delta for the SOPER satellites (Table 3-3) is currently 3.97 years and 
still rising. OOR cost increases had the greatest negative impact on cost effectiveness, 
raising the number of necessary satellites serviced to 4.72 with a 50% cost increase. 
Satellite cost as well as launch cost increases were fairly insignificant. 
C. RISK ASSESS:MENT 
Every satellite launched has an associated risk that it may not operate correctly 
once placed on-orbit. Extensive testing is conducted to ensure every component will 
operate and interface as designed. However, examples such as the Hubble telescope 
prove that anything is possible. The risk associated with new technology is usually higher 
than previously proven systems, however for the purpose of this analysis the risk of 
satellite/OOR failure will be considered comparable. 
Launch failure risk will be considered equal in a one-to-one launch ratio. 
However, increased launches would represent a higher risk factor. The additional launch 
risk can be specifically identified through launch failure/success probability analysis. The 
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specific cost of risk, although not equated to a firm dollar figure, is its impact on program 
cost through insurance or an actual launch failure; either would greatly impact program 
cost. Increased satellite launches provide increased opportunity to experience a launch 
failure. Although insurance can mitigate launch risk, NASA, the U.S. government, and 
many large manufacturers typically self-insure due to excessive coverage rates (typically 
10% or more of total satellite/launch costs). 
D. FUEL TRANSFER 
The OOR design/operations must take into account several factors which may not 
seem readily apparent. The first is how much fuel is available to transfer to the satellite. 
With an anticipated total fuel load of 800lbs of mono-propellant (primary fuel used in 
geosynchronous orbits), the transfer system is envisioned with the ability to cross-feed 
both its own thrusters and the refueling system from any fuel tank/cell. This design 
feature would preclude the OOR from running out of maneuvering fuel with transferable 
fuel still onboard and vice-versa. This would allow maximum flexibility and utilization 
of all onboard fuel. 
The next decision is how much fuel to transfer to the satellite. The initial impulse 
is to "fill-it-up" as the cost difference between lOOlbs and 200lbs of fuel is negligible. 
However, when you consider distributing the 200lbs of fuel between two separate 
satellites which need refueling the decision becomes more of a dilemma. Maneuvering 
fuel on a dead satellite is almost as worthless as a satellite with no maneuvering fuel. An 
option could be to conduct a statistical evaluation of remaining satellite life and fueling 
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for perhaps one additional year. This failure analysis would be satellite specific, requiring 
failure rates of onboard systems and hence will not be addressed here. 
Another operation concern is where to refuel? Should there be a malfunction 
during refueling operations the geosynchronous slot could be filled with debris, thus 
making it unusable. Perhaps satellites should be boosted to a higher orbit for safety 
reasons. This would obviously be driven by reliability and safety design factors of the 
OOR as well as fuel budget. The only remaining fuel question is, how much fuel is 
required onboard the OOR to service the required number of cost effective satellites? 
E. SATELLITE REFUELING REQUIREMENTS 
[All Equations from Space Mission Analysis and Design, Second Edition Ref 21] 
How much fuel must be transferred to ensure the satellite will meet the required 
life delta of three years? The answer to this question involves many computations based 
on specific satellite/orbital parameters. Satellite North/South drift as well as East/West 
drift compensation must be considered. Satellites in geosynchronous orbit have a N/S 
drift of approximately .089 degrees/year [Ref 22 p. 155]. Inclination tolerance, or how 
much drift above or below the equator can be tolerated, is the driving factor in fuel budget 
computations. Typically the time between maneuvers (At) is twice the time it takes the 
satellite to drift from the initial orbit insertion point (X1 ,the lower limit of satellite 
inclination tolerance) to the equator or At1+ A1i, since the drift times are equal. This is 





Figure 12. Satellite N/S Drift 
To compute the time interval between N/S station keeping maneuvers (dt}: 
at = total inclination tolerance/satellite drift 
dt = (2) X (.1)/.0897°= .2229 yrs or 81.38 days 
Total inclination tolerance is the angle the satellite must pass through to exceed 
tolerance. Inclination tolerance is usually payload driven, due to specific pointing or 
accuracy requirements. Typically the satellite is first inserted into orbit such that it is at 
the lower limit of drift tolerance (in this case at -.1 degrees). This position is represented 
by X1,shown above in Figure 12. The satellite then drifts northward until it reaches the 
upper limit of tolerance (X2}, when corrective action must be taken to reposition the 
satellite within the payload tolerance requirements. A velocity is applied to the satellite 
using onboard thrusters to return the satellite to X1• An additional velocity, equal to the 
first but in the opposite direction, must also be applied to stop it once it gets there. The 
formula for this corrective thrust or delta velocity is: 
Jl.v = 2Vsin 8/2 Where e = 2(ai), ll.i =satellite inclination tolerance (.1 for 
this example) 
V =Velocity in Geosychonous orbit= (631.3481)(RgeoYYz 
Rgeo= Earth radius+ Satellite Altitude= 6373km + 35786km =42164km 
V = 3.075km/s 
Jl.v = 2 (3.075) sin (.1) 
ll.v = .0107km/s (10.7m/s) which must be applied every 81.38 days (for this example) 
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Total N/S stationkeeping for an additional three year lifetime must take into 
account satellite N/S position at refueling. To believe the satellite would require 
fueling at the southern point of inclination tolerance would be overly optimistic. The 
optimum position for refueling would be at inclination of zero, or at the equator. This 
position would require no inclination change for the OOR, which serves to conserve 
onboard fuel assets. Using this positional data, the next satellite repositioning would be 
at half the computed at, since the satellite would drift north from the refueling point 
(equator) to the upper limit of satellite inclination and the equation above computes total 
satellite ~t (X1 to X2). In this case time to drift from the equator to X2 would be 40 
days, at which point a maneuver must be performed to move the satellite back to X1• 
The normal at intervals of 80 days (for this example) would then apply. 
Satellite mass also plays an important part in this problem. Computing the actual 
fuel required for the a v, shown above, requires a formula for the mass of propellant as a 
fraction of initial satellite mass. Example continued: 
Mp = Mo[1-e-<<1vt(IspxG>] Where: avis the computed velocity (from above) 
: Isp is the specific impulse of the fuel used 
(typically 220-240 for mono-propellant) 
: G = gravitational acceleration of the earth 
For the example above: Mp/Mo = [ 1-e-<10·7'<220 x 9·8>] = .004951, which must be applied to 
the mass of the satellite to determine how much fuel is required. 
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Table 5-8 summarizes the Mp/Mo computations for some specific inclination 
tolerances, which will then be applied to example satellites. 
Inclination Tolerance at- days avm/sec Mp/Mo 
.1 81.38 10.73 .004966 
.3 244.15 32.20 .014824 
.5 406.91 53.66 .024586 
.7 569.67 75.14 .034251 
1.0 813.83 107.33 .048563 
Table 5-8 
Applying the computed Mp/Mo for each inclination to satellites of various mass 
results in: 
Satellite Mp/Mo Fuellbs/maneuver Total Maneuvers/3yrs Total Fuel 
Mass .1° Jncl Required - lbs 
1500lbs .004966 7.449278 13 105 
2000lbs .004966 9.93237 13 139 
2500lbs .004966 12.41546 13 174 
3000lbs .004966 14.89856 13 209 
3500lbs .004966 17.381 13 226 
Table 5-9 
54 
Satellite Mp/Mo Fuellbs/maneuver Total Maneuvers/3yrs Total Fuel 
Mass .3° Incl Required 
1500lbs .014824 22.23614 4 89 
2000lbs .014824 29.64818 4 119 
2500lbs .014824 37.06023 4 148 
3000lbs .014824 44.47227 4 178 
3500lbs .014824 51.884 4 208 
Table 5-10 
Satellite Mp/Mo Fuellbs/maneuver Total Maneuvers/3yrs Total Fuel 
Mass .5° Incl Required 
1500lbs .024586 36.87906 3 111 
2000lbs .024586 49.17207 3 148 
2500lbs .024586 61.46509 3 185 
3000lbs .024586 73.75811 3 222 
3500lbs .024586 86.051 3 259 
Table 5-11 
Satellite Mp/Mo Fuellbs/maneuver Total Maneuvers/3yrs Total Fuel 
Mass .7° Incl Required 
1500lbs .034251 51.37688 2 103 
2000lbs .034251 68.50251 2 137 
2500lbs .034251 85.62814 2 172 
3000lbs .034251 102.7538 2 206 
3500lbs .034251 119.8785 2 240 
Table 5-12 
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Satellite Mp/Mo1 Fuellbs/maneuver Total Maneuvers/3yrs Total Fuel 
Mass 1.0° lncl Required 
1500lbs .048563 72.84478 1 73 
2000lbs .048563 97.12638 1 98 
2500lbs .048563 121.408 1 122 
3000lbs .048563 145.6896 1 146 
3500lbs .048563 169.971 1 170 
Table 5-13 
Longitudinal drift is primarily caused by the oblatness near the earth's equator. 
There are two stable positions (75 and 255 degrees East) and all satellites will drift to the 
closest stable point. The total fl. v required to maintain longitudinal stationkeeping can 
be expressed as: ll.v = 1.7351 sin(2(Ld- L8)) I Where: Ld =the desired longitude 
Ls = the closest stable longitude 
Assuming the worst case of this equation (sin function= 1), the largest ll.v 
possible is 1.735m/sec per year. For the assumed satellite life delta of three years, the 
totalll.v is 5.205m/sec. Converting ll.v to a percentage of satellite mass: 
Mp/Mo = [1-e-<f:.vt(zzox 9·8)] = .00241, which when applied to various satellites yields: 
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Satellite Mass Mp/Mo lbs Fuel Required - 3yrs 
1500 .00241 3.66 
2000 .00241 4.83 
2500 .00241 6.02 
3000 .00241 7.24 
3500 .00241 8.44 
Table 5-14 
OOR maneuvering fuel used traveling between satellites must also be considered. 
Using the worst case scenario of each satellite being 180 degrees from the previous 
refueling target, the total velocity required to reposition (and stop) the OOR can be 
expressed as: 
ll.v = 5.66(/l.~/n) m/sec Where: fl.~= Degrees oflongitude repositioning 
n = Number of days required to reposition 
Computing for various values of n yields: 
n=Xdays ll.v- rnlsec Mp/Mo 
30 33.96 .015628 
60 16.98 .007844 
90 11.32 .005237 
120 8.49 .003930 
180 5.66 .002622 
Table 5-15 
Converting this to fuel required, using Mp/Mo (the percentage of OOR mass) for 
each ll.v computed in Table 5-15 yields: 
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OORMass Mp/Mo Fuel Required - lbs 
3500 .015628 (n = 30days) 55 
3500 .007844 (n = 60 days) 28 
3500 .005237 (n = 90 days) 19 
3500 .003930 (n = 120 days) 14 
3500 .002622 (n = 180 days) 10 
Table 5-16 
It is apparent that as n continues to increase the required fuel consumption 
decreases. Since it is unlikely that each satellite would require servicing at the same 
time, planning for lower fuel consumption is viable. The time/fuel tradeoff would 
depend on the urgency of the refueling mission. It is cheaper to burn fuel for 
longitudinal changes than inclination changes. However, OOR inclination changes 
may be required, should a satellite be unable to be refueled at the equator. The a v 
required for OOR inclination changes can be computed using the equation: 
av = 2(Vi)(sin8/2) where: Vi= velocity at geosynchronous orbit (3.07kms) 
e = angle of orbit inclination change required 
Applying OOR inclination changes to various angles yields: 
e -Inclination a v required Mp/Mo OORMass Fuel Required 
Angle m/sec (lbs) (lbs) 
1 53.58 .024735 3500 75 
2 107.16 .048417 3500 146 
3 160.73 .071955 3500 216 
4 214.30 .094911 3500 285 
5 267.82 .116889 3500 350 
Table 5-17 
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The inclination fuel requirement is really twice the computed value shown in 
Table 5-17, as the OOR must be returned to an inclination of zero to service the next 
satellite at the optimum position. Some of this fuel cost could be mitigated by servicing 
the remaining satellites at the top of their inclination tolerance vice at the equator, 
however, it is obvious that inclination changes are not desirable due to the excessive fuel 
required. 
OOR maneuvering fuel for docking must also be considered, although there is no 
specific formula for this computation. Using historical data from the Challenger 





A. SUMMARY SYSTEM TRADES 
There can be little argument that in geosynchronous orbit, fuel is the limiting 
factor and that the technology exists to conduct on-orbit refueling. However, the cost 
effectiveness of OOR is not as clear-cut to determine. Chapter N provided the number 
of satellite refuelings necessary to obtain cost effectiveness. These estimates ranged 
from three to five satellites, using a life delta of three years. Utilizing this data coupled 
with the information in Chapter V on fuel consumption and budgets, an approximation 
of fuel required for best and worst case can be compiled. The satellite weights listed in 
Appendix A are satellite launch weights, fully fueled. For the purpose of this 
comparison, satellites will be assumed near fuel depletion and dry weight estimates will 
be used. Fuel budgets for geosynchronous satellites typically range from 600-800lbs of 
fuel. [Ref 21, p.330-332] OOR repositioning is evaluated at one less than the number of 
satellites to be serviced, assuming the initial OOR orbit insertion will accomplish 
positioning near the first satellite to be serviced. Using the basic information from Table 
5-2, fuel budget estimates for the best case refueling and yields Table 6-1. 
Evidenced by the data in Table 6-1, best case numbers support the refueling of 
seven satellites within the initial onboard fuel restriction of 800lbs. However, by 
evaluating a satellite inclination tolerance of .5 vice 1.0 degrees would increase fuel 
required for each satellite serviced by approximately 40lbs of fuel, which is shown in 
Table 6-2. 
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Satellite Mass (Dry) 3 Sats 4 Sats 5 Sats 6 Sats 7 Sats 
1500LBS Serviced Service Serviced Serviced Serviced 
Fuel Fuel Fuel Fuel Fuel 
Required Required Required Required Required 
N/S Station Keeping 219 292 365 438 511 
(lncl Tolerance 1.0 
degrees) 
Satellite E/W 11 15 19 23 27 
Stationkeeping 
OOR repositioning 2 Repos 3 Repos 4Repos 5 Repos 6Repos 
n = 120 days 28 32 46 60 74 
Docking Maneuvers (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
48lbs 64lbs 80lbs 96lbs 110 lbs 
Inclination Change OOlbs OOlbs OOlbs OOlbs OOlbs 
TOTAL FUEL 306 407 510 617 722 
REQUIRED - lbs 
Table 6-1 
Note: changes in satellite life delta will alter best/worst case inclinations by 
changing the total N/S stationkeeping maneuvers required throughout the chosen life 
delta. 
Satellite Mass 3 Sats 4 Sats 5 Sats 6 Sats 7 Sats 
(Dry) 1500lbs 
TOTAL FUEL 426 567 710 857 1002 
REQUIRED -lbs 
Table 6-2 
This reduces the number of satellites able to be serviced to five, within the 
restriction of 800lbs of onboard fuel, which is still cost effective. Decreasing the time 
between satellite refuelings to n = 30 days (Table 5-16) increases each OOR repositioning 
fuel budget by 4llbs, which yields: 
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Satellite Mass 3 Sats 4 Sats 5 Sats 6 Sats 7 Sats 
(Dry) 1500lbs 
TOTAL FUEL 508 690 874 1062 1248 
REQUIRED -lbs 
Table 6-3 
The resulting increase in OOR repositioning fuel consumption (Table 6-3) reduces 
the number of satellites able to be serviced to four, and hence cost effectiveness is 
questionable. However, with an inclination change of just one degree (Table 5-21) 
indicates an increase in fuel consumption of at least 75lbs, or 150lbs if you return the 
OOR to zero inclination. This would directly impact cost effectiveness, reducing the 
number of satellites able to be serviced to three. 
Re-evaluating the problem using a satellite mass of 2500lbs with optimum 
inclination tolerance of 1 degree yields: 
Satellite Mass 3 Sats 4Sats 5 Sats 6 Sats 7 Sats 
(Dry) 2500lbs Serviced Serviced Serviced Serviced Serviced 
Fuel Fuel Fuel Fuel Fuel 
Required Required Required Required Required 




Satellite E/W 19 25 31 38 44 
Stationkeeping 
OOR repositioning 24 42 56 70 84 
n = 120 days 2Repos 3 Repos 4 Repos Repos 6 Repos 
Docking Maneuvers 48 64 80 96 112 
Inclination Change 00 00 00 00 00 
TOTAL FUEL 461 619 777 936 1034 
REQUIRED - lbs 
Table 6-4 
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Evidenced by the data in Table 6-4, the refueling of five satellites can be 
conducted within the onboard fuel restriction of 800lbs, which still meets cost 
effectiveness criteria .. However, by evaluating a satellite inclination tolerance of .5 
degrees (worst case) fuel required for each satellite serviced would increase by 
approximately 65lbs, yields: 
Satellite Mass 3 Sats 4 Sats 5 Sats 6 Sats 7 Sats 
(Dry) 2500lbs 
TOTAL FUEL 656 879 1104 1326 1489 
REQUIRED- lbs 
Table 6-5 
This reduces the number of satellites able to be serviced to three, within the restriction of 
800lbs of onboard fuel, which is not cost effective. 
Decreasing the time between satellite refuelings to n = 30 days (Table 5-16) 
increases each OOR repositioning fuel budget by 41lbs, which yields: 
Satellite Mass 3 Sats 4 Sats 5 Sats 6 Sats 7 Sats 
(Dry) 2500lbs 
TOTAL FUEL 738 1002 1266 1531 1735 
REQUIRED - lbs 
Table 6-6 
The resulting increase in OOR repositioning fuel consumption (Table 6-6) does 
not reduce the number of satellites able to be serviced below three but cost effectiveness 
is certainly not going to increase. 
Re-evaluating the problem using a satellite mass of 3500lbs with optimum 
inclination tolerance of 1 degree yields: 
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Satellite Mass 3 Sats 4Sats 5 Sats 6 Sats 7 Sats 
(Dry) 3500lbs Serviced Serviced Serviced Serviced Serviced 
Fuel Fuel Fuel Fuel Fuel 
Required Required Required Required Required 




Satellite E/W 27 36 45 54 63 
Stationkeeping 
OOR repositioning 28 42 56 70 84 
n = 120 days 2Repos 3 Repos 4Repos Repos 6Repos 
Docking Maneuvers 48 64 80 96 112 
Inclination Change OOlbs OOlbs OOlbs OOlbs OOlbs 
TOTAL FUEL 613 822 1031 1240 1449 
REQUIRED -lbs 
Table 6-7 
Evidenced by the data in Table 6-7, three satellites can be refueled within the 
800lb OOR fuel restriction, which does not meet cost effectiveness criteria. Again 
evaluating a satellite inclination tolerance of .5 degrees (worst case) would increase fuel 
required for each satellite serviced by approximately 90lbs, yielding: 
Satellite Mass 3500lbs 3 Sats 4 Sats 5 Sats 6 Sats 7 Sats 
TOTAL FUEL- lbs 883 1182 1481 1780 2079 
Table 6-8 
This reduces the number of satellites able to be serviced to two, within the 
restriction of 800lbs of onboard fuel, which is not cost effective. Decreasing the time 
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between satellite refuelings to n = 30 days (Table 5-16) increases each OOR repositioning 
fuel budget by 41lbs, which yields: 
Satellite Mass 3 Sats 4 Sats 5 Sats 6 Sats 7 Sats 
(Dry) 3500lbs 
TOTAL FUEL 965 1305 1645 1985 2325 
REQUIRED - lbs 
Table 6-9 
The resulting increase in OOR repositioning fuel consumption (Table 6-9) does not 
reduce the number of satellites able to be serviced below two, but cost effectiveness is 
certainly not going to improve. 
However, actual on-orbit refueling targets will probably consist of a cross section 
of satellite sizes, instead of all of one size as examined in the examples above. Re-
evaluating the problem using a cross section of satellite sizes 1500lbs, 2500lbs, and 
3500lbs with optimum inclination tolerance of 1 degree yields the results shown in Table 
6-10. 
Evidenced by the data in Table 6-10, five satellites can be refueled within the 
800lb OOR fuel restriction, which meets cost effectiveness criteria. Again evaluating a 
satellite inclination tolerance of .5 degrees (worst case) would increase fuel required for 
each satellite serviced by approximately 40lbs, 65lbs, and 90lbs, respectively, and is 
shown in Table 6-11. 
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Satellite Mass 3 Sats 4 Sats 5 Sats 6 Sats 7 Sats 
(Dry) 2 of each Serviced Serviced Serviced Serviced Serviced 
rotation order- 1500, Fuel Fuel Fuel Fuel Fuel 
2500, & 3500lbs Required Required Required Required Required 




Satellite E/W 20 40 52 61 65 
Stationkeeping 
OOR repositioning 28 42 56 70 84 
n = 120 days 2 Repos 3 Repos 4Repos Repos 6 Repos 
Docking Maneuvers 48 64 80 96 112 
Inclination Change OOlbs OOlbs OOlbs OOlbs OOlbs 
TOTAL FUEL 461 584 748 909 1243 
REQUIRED - lbs 
Table 6-10 
II Satellite Mass 3500lbs 3 Sats 4 Sats 5 Sats 6 Sats 7 Sats 
II TOTAL FUEL -lbs 656 819 1048 1299 1673 
Table 6-11 
This reduces the number of satellites able to be serviced to three, within the 
restriction of 800lbs of onboard fuel, which is not cost effective. Decreasing the time 
between satellite refuelings to n = 30 days (Table 5-16) increases each OOR repositioning 
fuel budget by 41lbs, which yields: 
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Satellite Mass 3 Sats 4 Sats 5 Sats 6 Sats 7 Sats 
(Dry) 3500lbs 
TOTAL FUEL 738 942 1221 1504 1919 
REQUIRED - lbs 
Table 6-12 
The resulting increase in OOR repositioning fuel consumption (Table 6-12) does not 
reduce the number of satellites able to be serviced below three, but cost effectiveness is 
certainly not going to improve. 
Obviously, as satellite mass increases the cost effectiveness of on-orbit refueling 
decreases. However, the initial design limitation of 800lbs is not carved in stone. With 
an increase to 1250lbs of fuel, the cost effectiveness for five satellites can be maintained 
throughout all examples with the exception of 3500lb satellites computed in Tables 6-
7/8/9. Launch capability of the Delta IV-IUS is 5200lbs which would allow for an 
increased fuel payload. Consulting the Appendix A satellite data reveals that only 20 
satellites exceed 3000lbs fueled, hence limiting the possibility of the latter fuel 
computational restrictions shown in Tables 6-7/8/9. By increasing the OOR fuel 
payload, the impact on the OOR cost would be minimal, with OOR structure and the fuel 
transfer package being the most obvious areas for cost increases (i.e., a larger/heavier 
structure in order to support the additional fuel weight and a heavier fuel transfer package 
for the additional fuel tanks and piping required). These OOR cost areas (discussed in 
Chapter IV) do not carry a significant cost multiple and hence would not greatly impact 
OOR cost. Additionally, factors such as time between satellite refueling and inclination 
changes can be managed to reduce fuel impact. 
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B. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS 
Planning and cost analysis was done assuming the OOR was a "throw away" or 
one time only use vehicle. If the OOR was constructed using modular/ORU fuel cells and 
could be refueled in space for additional missions, this would greatly improve OOR cost 
effectiveness. This "refueling of the refueler" would probably have to occur in low earth 
orbit (LEO), perhaps as a space station mission. Replacement fuel cells could be 
launched onboard shuttle flights as space available cargo. thus saving launch costs for 
future OOR missions and further enhancing cost effectiveness. However, the de-orbit to 
LEO would have negative impact on OOR fuel. This impact could possibly be limited by 
the Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle concept which proposes use of the Earth's 
atmosphere to slow and capture the spacecraft. thus obtaining low earth orbit after initial 
de-orbit. This concept would require further analysis which exceeds the scope of this 
paper. 
Satellite on-orbit refueling is both cost effective and tactically significant. As 
satellite program costs continue to increase and operations and research budgets continue 
to decrease the cost savings and operational flexibility provided by on-orbit refueling 




SATELLITE DATA SUMMARY 


































































































LAUNCH DESIGN vs 
I VEHICLE ~CTUAL LIFE REMARKS 
ATLAS CENTAUR 7\8.3 FUEL DEPLETED 1984 
ATLAS CENTAUR 7\10 FUEL DEPLETED 1986 
ATLAS CENTAUR 7\17 FUEL DEPLETED 1993 
ATLAS CENTAUR 5\18 SOPER FUEL CONSERVE OPS(FCO) MAR 95 
ATLAS CENTAUR 5\15 FCO EOL 1992 
DELTA 7\11 EOL 1990 
ATLAS CENTAUR 5\15 FCO 
~· 5\2 FAILED EOL 1988 SUPERSYNC BOOST 
ATLAS CENTAUR 5\15.3 FCO 
DELTA 7\9.4 FUEL DEPLETED 1990 
ATLAS CENTAUR 7\16 SOPER FCODEC 1988 
ATLAS CENTAUR 7\15 SOPEF 
THOR DELTA 5\3-8 MAGE FAIL '84>RELAY MSN, FUEL '89 
ATLAS CENTAUR 7\15 SOPER FCOMAY 1988 
ATLAS CENTAUR 5\5 DAMAGED ON LAUNCH EOL 1986 
DELTA 7\14.7 SOPER FCOOCT 1989 
DELTA 10\10 EOL 1991 
ATLAS CENTAUR 7\15 SOPER FCO MAY 1989 
SHUTILE 7\13.5 FUEL DEPLETED JUN 1995 
DELTA 10\9 EOL 1991 
DELTA 10\9.5 FAILED NOV 1991 
ATLAS CENTAUR 7\13.5 FCOAPR 1989, DIED NOV 1995 
DELTA 10\10 FUEL DEPLETED MAY 1992 
ATLAS CENTAUR 7\14 SOPER FCOAPR 1989 
THOR DELTA 10\14 SOPER OK 
TITAN 10\14 FCOMAR 1995 
TITAN 10\14 FCOMAR 1995 
SHUTILE 10\12 SOPER JS FAIL·REQ USE OF 370KG MAN FUI 
DELTA 10\ EOL 































































































125 ATLAS CENTAUR 
92 DELTA 
DESIGNvs 
!ACTUAL LIFE REMARKS 
7\13 SOPER FCOJAN 1991 
---·-·· --------- - ---- ---- ·- - ---
10\SOPER3 
.. .. ----- -·· --
10\13 SOPER FCO SEP 1993 
-------
10\11.5 EOL 1994 
10\10.5 FCO 
-----
9\11 EOL 1995 
---~ 
10\12 SOPER CHINASAT FCO 
---- -- --
9\12 SOPER FCOAUG 1992 
1-o\f2-s6PER . -- --------- ------- . FCOJAN 1995 
7\11.5 FUEL DEPLETED MAY 1994 
----
10\11.5 .FCO 
10\11 FUEL DEPLETED OCT 1~-~? ___ ---1 
---
7\8 FAILED SEP 1992 
BOOST FAIL REOD REPAiR- - -i 
- -- I 
10\12 SOPER OK ! 
-- ----· - --· 
7\10.3 SOPER OK 
----------------- -·. ---
10\11 SOPER FCO 
---
----- ·-·-··-
10\11 SOPER FCO 
-
----. 
9\11 SOPER FCOAUG 1994 
-·-···· -··· 
10\9 --~Q_L~-~ 1994?£_~<:) 






7\11 SOPER FCOAUG 1990 
10\11 SOPER OK ----=~ :-J 10\10 SOPER OK 
----------
10\10 SOPER FCOOCT 1993 
-----
5\9.1 SOPER FCO 




-- -···-·· ---- ···-- -------------------------SPACENET3R 03/11/88 1250 75 
iiNTELSAT 513 05/17/88 2013 
PAS 1 06/15/88 1220 40 GSTAR3 09/08/88 1250 33.33 SBS5 09/08/88 1241 50 
TORS F3 09/29/88 2200 250 
INTELSAT 515 01/27/89 2013 
TORS F4 03/13/89 2200 100 OSCS 111-4 09/04/89 1170 150 FLTSATCOM 8 09/25/89 1100 
INTELSAT 602 10/27/89 4600 140 
SATELLITES LAUNCHED SINCE 1990 
LEASAT 5 6894 85 INTELSAT 603 4600 
INTELSAT 604 4600 140 GALAXY6 01/09/90 1212 
SBS6 03/14/90 2478 60 SATCOM C1 06/23/90 1169 
GSTAR4 10/12/90 1295 
SPACENET4 10/12/90 728 75 AURORA2 11/20/90 1338 88 TDRSF5 11/20/90 2200 30 INTELSAT 605 04/13/91 4600 140 INTELSAT 601 05/29/91 4600 140 GALAXY5 08/02/91 1412 
GALAXY? 08/14/91 2986 
SATCOM C4 10/29/91 1402 
SATCOM C3 03/14/92 1375 
REMARKS 
. -------] ARIANE 10\8 SOPER 
----- FCOA~~-i995 ___ .:~~-ARIANE 9\8 SOPER 
ARIANE4 11\8 SOPER FUEL FOR 13.5 YEARS i 
ARIANE 10\8 SOPER BOOST FAIL- USED 80% MAN FUEL I 
ARIANE 10\8 SOPER OK 
I SHUTTLE 10\8 SOPER __ ______ FCO ___ ... 
ARIANE 9\7 SOPER FCOMAY 1997 
-------------SHUTTLE 10\8 SOPER 
---------- - -- -- -- -----TITAN 10\6 SOPER 
ATLAS CENTAUR 7\6.3 SOPER 
---ARIANE 13\7 SOPER OK 
-------
-------SHUTTLE 7\6 SOPER OK 
TITAN 13\6 SOPER NEW KICK MTR INSTALL STS49 1992 
TITAN 13\6 SOPER OK 
ARIANE4 10\6 SOPER OK 
ARIANE4 10\6 SOPER ONBOARD FUEL FOR 15.6 YEARS 
ARIANE 10\6 SOPER OK 
ARIANE 10\6 SOPER 
--------------DELTA2 10\5 SOPER OK 
DELTA 12\5 SOPER 
SHUTTLE 10\5 SOPER OK 
ARIANE 15\6 SOPER OK 
ARIANE 13\5 SOPER OK 
ATLAS 1 10\4 SOPER ONLY FUEL FOR 9 YEARS 
ARIANE4 15\4 SOPER ONLY FUEL FOR 12 YEARS 
DELTA 12\4 SOPER OK 
----ARIANE 4 12\4 SOPER 





INTELSAT 701 08/31/92 
INTELSAT 702 09/10/92 
INTELSAT 703 01/13/93 
INTELSAT 704 03/25/93 
INTELSAT 705 09/03/93 
INTELSAT 706 10/22/93 
INTELSAT 707 06/17/94 
INTELSAT 708 06/24/94 







TELSTAR 402R 10/22/95 








LAMSC/M~AI _l_ 12/01/90 
LAUNCH SATELLITE 























l 1 100 
LAUNCH DESIGN vs 
VEHICLE !ACTUAL LIFE REMARKS 
ATLAS CENTAUR 10\6 SOPER OK 
ARIANE44 65% at 1 Oyrs 
ARIANE44 65% at 1 Oyrs 
-ATLAS II 65% at 1 Oyrs 
ATLAS II 65% at 1 Oyrs 
.. 
ATLAS II 65% at 1 Oyrs 
---ARIANE44 65% at 1 Oyrs FUEL FOR 15YRS 
LONG MARCH3B 65% at 1 Oyrs LAUNCH FAILURE 
---------ARIANE44 65% at 1 Oyrs 
-------------ARIANE44 65% at 1 Oyrs 
-------11 
ATLAS IIA 10 
--10 
·------·-
-- --------------------SHUTTLE 10 
----···-SHUTTLE 10 
-·----ARIANE 12 
-------ATLAS CENTAUR 10-15YRS PARTIAL LAUNCH FAILURE - ORBIT 
ATLAS CENTAUR 10-15YRS 
--ATLAS CENTAUR 10-15YRS 
ATLAS CENTAUR 10-15YRS 
--ATLAS CENTAUR 10-15YRS 
ATLAS CENTAUR 10-15YRS 
--
-----···-·· 




FOR COST ANALYSIS ONLY l l I 
-..] 
0'\ 
LAUNCH SATELLITE LAUNCH DESIGN vs 
J SATELLITE LAUNCHED WEIGHT KG COST$M VEHICLE !ACTUAL LIFE REMARKS INMARSAT F1 02101/91 80 
--
-·---~--------- --- ··-------- ···- --·· INMARSATF2 02101/91 80 
--r------------·--- --- -·- - ....... ···-·· INMARSAT F3 02101/91 80 
-- ------------- --------------· --· ········---INMARSAT F4 02101/91 80 
-----~----~ ASIASAT (GE) 09/01/92 133 
------INTELSAT 801 09/01/92 82.5 
INTELSAT 802 09/01/92 82.5 
---------------INTELSAT 806 03/01/94 82.3 
. -
---------- ------------TDRS8 02101/96 160.5 
---------------. TDRS9 02101/96 160.5 
---------TDRS10 02101/96 160.5 
UHF7 3000 94.4 10-15YRS 
----------------------UHF8 3000 121 10-15YRS 








10-15YRS CONTRACT MEAN 112.3875 
!LAUNCHED/CONTRACT MEAN FOR SATELLITES SINCE 1990 98.85125 
-------m--------·-- ] 
APPENDIXB: 
DSCS IIIB SATELLITE DATA 
[Ref20] 
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SATEWTE NAME: DSCS IIIB 
GENERAL BLOCK l OESIGNA TEO UNfTS: 
Block B. Units B4 through B7 
VSER{CONTRAcnNQ; 
AF SMC 
CONTRACTOR: CO!il'RA.CT COMPLETTON: 
General Electric 
TYPE OF CONTRACT: 
FPIF 
PRECECESSCR VEHICLES: 
DSCS Ill -A1, A2. and A3 
LAUNCH· WEIGHT (U3): DRY WEIGHT (LB): 
1883.70 
LAUNCH VEHICLE; FIRST LAUNCH DATE: LAST LAUNCH DATE: 
Atlas II, Shuttle. Dual 
Compatible, Centaur & IUS 

















The DSCS Ill was developed for the Air Force by GE. Its mission is to provide uninterrupted secure strategic and tactical voice and data transmission, military command and control, and ground mobile communications. This is achieved by antijam abilities and high frequency wideband communications. Block B consists of 11 satellites. some of which have already been delivered. Block B satellites are covered in two data packages. Block B1 consists of satellites B4-B7 and Block B2 consists of satellites B8-B14. These satellites have some solid state amplifiers replacing TWTAs, a new X-band downlink capability for the AFSATCOM transponder, and improved security equipment. 
DESCRIBE All CAVEATS 
The average recurring cost (and resulting first unit cost) for DSCS IIIB was significantly higher than that of DSCS lilA. The common belief is that significant overruns were incurred on the DSCS iliA contract, particular1y by the subcontractors operating under fixed price contracts. As a result. the DSCS IIIB recurring costs are more representative of the "true" recurring costs of the DSCS Ill program. Therefore. the data point for DSCS IIIB units 4 through 7 was used only in developing recurring CERs. Furthermore. due to the similarity of the two DSCS IIIB data points. in several cases these blocks were combined to form one data point and a new first unit cost was calculated. 
MAIN SUBSYSTEM/COMPONENT COST DRIVERS 
STRUCTURE 
THERMAL 
TYPE OF THERMAl. 
CONTROL 
srnuCTURE WEIGHT (LB): MATERIAL TYPE 
330 48 Aluminum. magnesium. beryllium. magnesium thorium 
THERMAL WEIGHT (LB) AVERAGE TEMP RA.NGE (DEG FAHRENHEfT) 
10193 70 
Passivejsemi·passive surface coating: single and multr·layer insulation: mirrored surface: passive conduction. Active;'semi·active· heaters and radiators. 
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SATEWllO NAME: DSCS 1118 
_(f 
MAIN SUBSYSTEM COMPONENT COST DRIVERS (Cont'd) 
·f ATTITUDE DETERMINATION & CONTROL SYSTEM ~ 
ACS WEICHT (t.B): 162.28 NO. Of TANKS: 4 J POINTlNG ACCURACY (DEC): 0.10 
RCS WEIGHT (t.B): 98.83 (included in ACS weight) 
SENSOR TYPES ~NCLUDE NO. OF EACH TYPE): Non-scanning Earth Sensors (2); Rate Gyro Assembly (1); Sun Sensors {2) 
TANK VOLUME (CU I H): Fuel-1388.75; Oxidizer- 4165.25 
TORQUE METHODS: Reaction Wheels 
: 
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM 
EPS WEIGHT (t.B): SOL POWER (WATTS): SOLAR ARRAY AREA (SO Fl): NO. OF SOLAR CELLS: GENERA nON WEIGHT (t.B): 585.59 Summer solstice: 1310; 126 31.72 
Autumnal Equinox: 1397 
8A TTERY TYPE WEIGHT OF ONE BATTERY (LB}: DISTRIBUTION WEICHT (LB): PCE SUIT£ WEICHT SA TTERY CAPACfTY (AND NO.) (L8): (AMP-HR): 
NiCd (3) 45.16 211.43 113.90 35.0 per battery 
APOGEE KICK MOTOR 
TOTAL IMPULSE: I AKM DRY WEIGHT (1.8): I STABIUZATION loiETHOD: 
TELEMETRY, TRACKING, AND COMMAND SYSTEM 
TUC WEICHT (t.B): POWER REQUIRED RF' POWER OUTP!JT TWTA OR SOUO STATE RECEIVER WEICHT (LB): (WATTS): (WATTS): AMPS: 
70.99 Solid State 9.00 
RECEIVER FREQUENCY TRANSMITTER WEICHT TlUNSMfrrER TRANSPONDER TRANSPONDER FREQUENCY (MHz): (MHZ): (L8): FREQUENCY (MHZ): WEICHT (LB): 
7600 14.16 7600 18.04 Receive A: 1807.764; 8: 1823.779 
Transmit A: 2257.5; 8: 2277.5 
DICIT AL ELECT WEICHT ANALOG ELECT ANTENNA WEICHT (l8): ANTENNA APERTURE ANTENNA CAIN (DECIBELS): (L8): WEICHT (L8): (INCHES): 
23.00 N/A 0.67 Not specified 65%: -7.5; 25%: -4.5 
TR.ANSMfTTER OIJTPUT TRANSPONDER OlfTPVT j DICITAL ELECT OUTPUT I DATA RATE <••1•1: POWER (WATTS): POWER (WATTS): POWER (WATTS): 
0.7 2.0 Command, Real Time: 1: Telemetry, Real Time: 1 
COMMUNICATION 
COMMWEIOHT I POWER REQUIRED I RF POWER OUTPUT (WATTS): I TWTA OR SOLID STATE AMPS: I RECEIVER WEICHT (L8): (L8): (WATTS): 
632.40 TVVTA & Solid State 51.26 
RECEIVER FREQUENCY (MH:z:): Freq Gen 5.00; SCT Converter. not specified; Freq Synth. not specified; SCT-SHF, 7975 
to 8025; SCT-UHF, Classified 
TRANSMITTER FREQUENCY (MHz): 
Freq STD. 5.0; LNA, not specified; TDAL. 7900 to 8400; TDL. not specified; TVVTA-10W: 7400 to 77500; TWTA-40W: 7250 to 7400; SCT-SHF: 8000; HESSA, not specified 
TRANSiolrTTER WT I TRANSPONDER WT l TRANSPONDER FREQUENCY I DICITAL ELECT WEICHT (l.B)o 1 ANACOC ELECT l AflTENHA WEICHT (LB): (L8): (MHz): WEJCKT (LB): (LB): 131.25 NjA N/A 56.96 9.42 305.60 
ANTENNA APERTURE {INCHES): ECH-R. 6.5; ECH-T. 7.7; Gimballed Dish Antenna. 855; 61 MBA Receive. 45; 19 Transmit MBA, 28; UHF Receive. not specified; UHF Transmtt. not specified 
ANTENNA PEAK CAIN (DECIBELS): ECH-R. 168 dBi; ECH-T. 17.0 dBi; Gimballed Dish Antenna. 30.2; 61 MBA Receive, 
narrow coverage-29.4. earth coverage-14.4; 19 Transmit MBA, narrow 
coverage-26/26.5, earth coverage-s1615; UHF Receive & Transmit, classified 
TRANSMITTER OUTPl!T POWER (WATTS): Freq STD. 2.02; LNA. MBA-1.5~. ECH-3.08; TDAL. Fetal-5.8; TDL, not specif~~':!. 
TVVTA-10W, 10; TWTA-40W. 40; SCT-SHF, 50; HESSA, 10 




OOR NON-RECURRING COSTS ESTIMATES 
[All Equations from Unmanned Space Vehicle Cost Model, Seventh Edition-
Ref. 20] 
Satellite non-recurring cost consists of the Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation (RDT &E) which typically includes design, analysis, testing, prototypes and 
qualification runs. Additionally, it also includes ground station costs. The non-recurring 
cost estimate uses the same CER methodology used to estimate recurring cost in Chapter 
N. and are summarized in Table C-1. Non-recurring cost estimates for the OOR are as 
follows: 
1. STRUCTURE 
Spacecraft Structure 750 lbs 
Y=(99.045)(Xl)0·789 
Where Xl= Structure Weight 
Y = CER value for Spacecraft Structure 
Therefore Y= 18376.21 
2.THERMAL 
Thermal Weight 165lbs 
Y= (0.243)(Xl)o.s97 + (X2)o.9s3 
Where Xl= Thermal Weight 
X2= Satellite Weight 
Y = CER value for Spacecraft Structure 




- Determination Suite Weight 
- RCS Suite Weight 





Where Xl= Attitude Determination Suite Weight 
Y = CER value for ADCS (Attitude Determination) 
Therefore Y = 26746.02 
Y=(125.998)(Xl)0·733 
Where Xl= Reaction Control System Suite Weight 
Y = CER value for ADCS(Reaction Control) 
Therefore y = 6123.77 
4. ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM 
EPS 
- Number of Solar Cells 
- Generation Suite Weight 
- Beginning of Life Power 
- Storage Suite Weight 
-EPS Suite Weight 






Where Xl= (Generation Suite Weight)(Beginning Life Power 
(BOL)) 
X2= Number of Solar Cells 
Y = CER value for Electrical Power Generation 
Therefore Y = 1032 
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Y=(l14.127) + (2.584)(X1) 
Where X1= (Weight of One Battery)(Capacity of One Battery) 
Y = CER value for Electrical Power Storage 
Therefore y =4183.93 
Y = (5.515)(X1) 
Where X1= BOL Power 
Y = CER value for Power Conditioning and Distribution 
Therefore y =6618.0 




- Digital Electronics (2 Links) 
- Antenna ( 4 Systems) 
Y =(67 .121 )(X1) 





Y = CER value for TT &C Transmitter 
Therefore y = 671.21 
Y = (-224.351) + (116.683)(X1) 
Where X1= Receive/Exciter Suite Weight 
Y = CER value for TT &C Receiver/Exciter 
Therefore y =825.80 
y = (211.243)(X1)o.7s7 (X2)o.ss3 
Where X1= Digital Electronics Suite Weight 
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X2= Number of Links 
Y = CER value for TT &C Digital Electronics 
Therefore y =4500.29 
Y = (-222.262) + (30.670)(Xl) + (480.840)(X2) 
Where . Xl= Antenna Suite Weight 
X2= Number of Antenna Systems 
Y = CER value for TT &C Antenna 
Therefore y = 1823.78 
6. COMMUNICATIONS 
Communications Transmitter (TWTA) 
- TWTA Weight 
- Solid State Transmitter 
- Receiver/Exciter 
- Transponder (2 units) 
- Digital Electronics( 5 links) 
- Antenna ( 4 systems) 
-Antenna Reflectors 
Y=(524.16l)(XI)0·875 








Y = CER value for Communications Transmitter (TWT A) 
Therefore y = 5473.61 
Y= (0.249)(XI)u01(X2)0·728 
Where XI= Solid State Transmitter Weight 
X2= Transmitter Frequency 
Y = CER value for Communications Transmitter (Solid 
State) 
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Therefore Y = 5283.18 
Y=(273.793)(Xl) 
Where Xl= Receiver/Exciter Suite Weight 
Y = CER value for Communications Receiver/Exciter 
Therefore Y = 8213.79 
Y =( 682.7 69)(X 1 )0·463 
Where Xl= Transponder Weight 
Y = CER value for Communications Transponder 
Therefore Y = 3297.47 
Y=(211.243)(X1)0·787(X2)0·853 
Where Xl= Digital Electronics Suite Weight 
X2= Number of Links 
Y = CER value for Communications Digital Electronics 
Therefore Y= 20074.15 
Y=(-222.262) + (30.670)(Xl) + (480.840)(X2) 
Where Xl= Antenna Suite Weight 
X2= Number of Antenna Systems 
Y = CER value for Communications Antenna 
Therefore Y = 6025.57 
Y=(1763.889)(Xl) 
Where Xl= Antenna Reflector Diameter Squared 
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Y = CER value for Communications Antenna Reflectors 
Therefore Y= 14111.11 
7. INTEGRATION ASSE:MBLY AND TEST (IA&T) 
IA&T 
- Spacecraft Weight 
- Fuel Transfer System (FTS) Total Weight 
-Weight 




Where Xl= Spacecraft Weight+ Payload (FTS) Non-Recurring 
Cost 
Y = CER value for IA&T 
Therefore y =29396.41 
8. PROGRAM LEVEL 
Satellite Total Recurring Cost 113000K 
y =(2.340)(X 1 )o.8o8 
Where Xl= Spacecraft Total Non-Recurring Cost 
Y = CER value for Program Level 
Therefore Y = 28320.65 
9. AEROSPACE GROUND EQUIP:MENT (AGE) 
Satellite Total Non-Recurring Cost 149976.41 K 
Y=(8.304)(Xl)0·638 
Where Xl= Space Vehicle Total Non-Recurring Cost 
Y = CER value for Aerospace Ground Equipment 
Therefore y = 16656.73 
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NON-RECURRING COST SUMMARY 
(in Thousands of Dollars) 
Structure 18376.21 
Thermal 12364.23 
Attitude Determination & Control 26746.02 
ADCS - Attitude Determination 6123.77 
RCS 
Electrical Power Supply 
EPS - Generation 1032.00 
EPS - Storage 4183.93 
EPS - PCD 6618.00 
Telemetry, Tracking & Command 
TT&C - Transmitter 671.21 
TT&C - Receiver/Exciter 825.80 
TT&C - Digital Electronics 4500.29 
TT&C - Antenna Suite 1823.78 
Communications 
Comm - Transmitter (TWTA) 5473.61 
Comm - Solid State 5283.18 
Comm - Receiver/Exciter 8213.79 
Comm - Transponder 3297.47 
Comm - Digital Electronics 20074.15 
Comm - Antenna 6025.57 
Comm - Antenna Reflectors 14111.11 
Fuel Transfer System (EST) 3156.52 
Total Spacecraft 148900.64 
IA&T 29396.41 
Program Level Cost 28320.65 
Aerospace Ground Equipment 16656.73 
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